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Abstract
The leading Iranian intellectual and nationalist Hasan Taqizadeh has been roundly condemned by posterity 
for his call to Iranians to embrace European civilisation in its entirety without qualification or compromise. 
Taqizadeh himself later conceded that the form of words he had used were injudicious, but he added that his 
intention had been to galvanise Iranians out of their self-destructive political stupor and it remains a reality 
that many of Taqizadeh’s contemporaries were supportive of his call to arms. This paper reassesses Taqiza-
deh’s position in the context of his historical and intellectual environment, which it is argued drew heavily 
from a “Whig” reading of the Enlightenment progress. It shows that Taqizadeh was not alone in drawing 
on this narrative while maintaining an important distinction between the positive aspects of British political 
thought and the shortcomings of British policy.
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In the introduction to a recent collection of Hasan 
Taqizadeh’s writings on “foreign” (i.e. Western) civi-
lisation, the editor took care to warn his readers of the 
impending dangers of the text before of them.1 Taqiza-
deh, among the leaders of the Constitutional move-
ment of 1906, was a political activist and intellectual 
perhaps most famous, if not notorious, for his call to 
arms in the pages of the nationalist organ, Kaveh, di-
recting Iranians to embrace the West wholeheartedly 
and without reservation. Taqizadeh’s uncompromising 
stance had long been condemned, even by his intel-
lectual fellow travellers as at best, overdone, and at 
worst treasonous.2 The editor of this particular edition 
by all accounts leaned towards the latter interpretation, 
taking the opportunity to draw on a long excerpt from 
Jalal Ale Ahmad, in order better to situate Taqizadeh 
as a prime example of the “Westoxicated” individual. 
It was not, to be sure, entirely Taqizadeh’s fault but 
a consequence of his situation. He was in the end a 
victim of his desperate circumstance, which made him 
vulnerable to the manipulations of others, not least the 
“politician” Edward Browne. How else, reflects the 
editor, can one begin to understand Taqizadeh’s will-
ingness to discard the sacred clothing of the clergy and 
don instead “the tie and ironed suit”, along with eau de 
cologne, and take a German wife.3 
1 Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 148. 
2 For example, Aryanpur 1350/1973: 232.
3 Alizadeh, introduction to Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 13–14.
This association with Edward Browne makes 
Taqizadeh emblematic of the infected “Oriental”, up-
rooted from his native culture, cast adrift in an alien 
world he seeks to transpose onto his own.4 Unsurpris-
ingly it is a reading of Taqizadeh that, with occasional 
nods to his obvious intellect, remains popular among 
proponents of Edward Said’s later polemic on “Ori-
entalism”. Many have since come to his defence, de-
ploring the lack of context with regard to the particular 
situation that Iran found itself in at the end of the Great 
War, and the fact that contrary to received wisdom, 
Taqizadeh’s call to arms had enjoyed the sympathy 
of many contemporaries who shared the belief that 
something had to be done to galvanise an otherwise 
dormant populace—and perhaps more pointedly, a po-
litical elite—into action.5 This is Taqizadeh as a polit-
ical activist, whose youthful enthusiasm for action got 
the better of his own common sense.6 Indeed, Taqiza-
deh’s rehabilitation had reached such a stage that even 
those who might be considered naturally antithetical 
to his project and political leanings, excuse it, not 
on the basis of unfortunate political expediency, but 
of simple—if uncharacteristic—ignorance. Taqiza-
deh was of course acutely aware of the storm he had 
caused, and the lectures included in the volume were 
4 Praise from Ann Lambton would only add to such a percep-
tion; see Lambton 2003: 109–11.
5 Behnam 2003: 82.
6 See Katouzian 2012: 195–213.
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his attempt in later life to explain and in part atone for 
the language (if not the sentiment) he had used and 
the misinterpretations that had resulted.7 Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that Taqizadeh was far from naïve 
or ignorant in the substance of his ideas or his appre-
ciation of “European civilisation”, and that on the 
contrary he was rigorous and precise in his application 
of these ideas and concepts. Yet, he was at the same 
time acutely sensible to the plight of his country and 
often struggled to communicate these ideas in a man-
ner that would energise his countrymen into action.8 It 
was this inherent contradiction between complex ideas 
and popular communication that he would frequently 
struggle to reconcile, and his tendency to exaggerate 
for political effect echoed the polemics of one of his 
political and intellectual heroes, Jamal al Din al-Af-
ghani. Like Afghani, Taqizadeh is best understood as a 
man of the Enlightenment, which in its philosophy of 
emancipation harboured elements of political icono-
clasm.9 It is in the context of this particular intellectual 
inheritance that Taqizadeh’s ideas and motives can be 
best understood, in particular the importance he gave 
to education—in the broadest sense of that word—, the 
acquisition of manners, and above all “civilisation”.
In order better to understand and appreciate this 
inheritance we need, however, to review our under-
standing of the intellectual movement known as the 
Enlightenment, which transformed European political 
and social relations from the end of the seventeenth 
century. For some, any association with the “Euro-
pean Enlightenment” is condemnation enough for 
a generation of political thinkers who are somehow 
7 See for example, Matin-Asgari 2014: 57.
8 As Vatandoust notes (1977: 53), Taqizadeh felt that his 
ideas were constantly misinterpreted.
9 See, for example, Taqizadeh’s reflections in his lectures to 
Columbia University on “The History of Modern Iran” in 
Taqizadeh 1979: 205; see also 1350/1972: 75–83. Afghani 
was a remarkably popular figure among the early national-
ists (who noted that he was also known as Asaadabadi) de-
scribing him as the “great philosopher of Iran”; Iranshahr 
1293/1923, III/1 and 2: 18; see also Iranshahr 1293/1923, 
II/1, 18 September : 46–52. Iranshahr reprinted one of 
Afghani’s lectures on the subject of education (largely in 
praise of philosophy) delivered at the Albert Hall in Calcut-
ta in 1872 (Iranshahr 1925, III/4, 15 February: 193–203. 
Similarly, in the journal Ayandeh 1927, 2, 5 July: 395–401, 
edited by Mahmoud Afshar. The belief that Afghani was in 
fact Iranian was well known and was articulated by Nizam 
al Islam Kirmani in “History of the Awakening of the Per-
sians”, quoted by Browne 1910: 4, n. 1.
held responsible for the failures of European civili-
sation in the twentieth century. The Enlightenment, 
as a somewhat monolithic intellectual movement, is 
held responsible—among other things—for imperial-
ism and the development of race theories through its 
promotion of ideas of polygenesis.10 Perhaps the most 
succinct and consequential articulation of this negative 
reading was by Edward Said in his influential critique 
Orientalism.11 Yet as some more recent sympathetic 
scholars are keen to point out, the ideas of the Enlight-
enment were neither uniform, nor can they sensibly be 
straitjacketed into “national” types. The philosophes 
of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries felt 
themselves to be heirs of a far more cosmopolitan 
tradition, which in some cases could be traced to the 
classical Islamic world.12 
These were not ideas bound by religion or geog-
raphy, but were common to humanity and sought to 
improve the welfare and position of mankind by a 
“revolution of the mind” achieved through education, 
broadly conceived and applied. This was education 
that was both practical (scientific) and ethical—the 
improvement of manners in order to attain a civilised 
state. Civilisation thus conceived was not a state of 
being but an aspiration to be sought, and what could 
be achieved could at the same time be lost. Although 
informed by classical conceptions, this state of civili-
sation was not inherently limited to a particular group, 
region, or biological “race”, such that even at the turn 
of the twentieth century, when race theories were argu-
ably becoming more popular, Japan could be consid-
ered, by virtue of its European inspired reforms, part 
of the civilised world.13 What mattered was education, 
and while ideas of race began to dominate the minds 
of some on the European continent, a different and 
more liberal narrative of the Enlightenment held on in 
what might be termed the British or Anglo-American 
tradition. This important distinction became apparent 
in an intellectual confrontation between British and 
German academics during the Great War, after the 
latter had protested at the deployment of “Asiatics” on 
the Western Front.14
10 See in this regard, Beasley 2010: 9–11, and in considerably 
more detail, Kidd 2006: 79–120.
11 Said 1978: 3. See in response to this, Bonakdarian 1993: 
7–31.
12 See for example, Israel 2006: 615–40.
13 Pistor-Hatam 1996: 111.
14 Greenwood et al. 1915: 9–10; see also Zimmern’s essay 
(1915: 363–64) in the collection on German and British ide-
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It nicely mirrors an earlier confrontation between 
the French philosopher Ernest Renan and Jamal al Din 
al-Afghani, who had responded to Renan’s criticism 
of “Semitic” religions in an articulate riposte that won 
him the praise of Renan. Afghani’s response to Renan, 
which appeared in the Journal des Débats in 1883, 
agreed with Renan that, “the Muslim religion has tried 
to stifle science and stop its progress” and that it had 
“succeeded in halting the philosophical or intellectual 
movement and in turning minds from the search from 
the scientific truth.” Moreover, he added, “I know all 
the difficulties that the Muslims will have to surmount 
to achieve the same degree of civilization, access to 
the truth with the help of philosophic and scientific 
methods being forbidden them.” But he stressed, it was 
not always thus, and to blame the Arabs as a people for 
the failures of the few was unjust. It was emphatically 
not the fault of a people but of a mindset, and there 
had been times in the past when the Catholic Church 
had been just as opposed to knowledge: “If it is true 
that the Muslim religion is an obstacle to the devel-
opment of sciences, can one affirm that this obstacle 
will not disappear one day? How does the Muslim 
religion differ on this point from other religions?”15 
Afghani’s response was as much (if not more) a call 
for education and philosophical inquiry, as a defence 
of the Arabs and of Islam as a faith—and in this he 
reflected his own intellectual sympathies—which was 
unsurprisingly well received by the philosophes of Eu-
rope, who regarded Afghani as an intellectual fellow 
traveller. Another central aspect of his argument, of 
course, was the possibility of change, improvement, 
and progress—key elements of the Enlightenment 
narrative. 
One of the attractions of Enlightenment thought 
was that it held out the possibility of progress for all, 
subject to the adoption of certain methods and atti-
tudes, to that revolution of the mind that opened it to 
enquiry and investigation. Iranian travellers to Britain 
in the early nineteenth century became attuned to this 
message. British success was not attested by simple 
force of arms but by political and social stability facili-
als of civilisation, the former focusing on the imposition of 
a “superior culture”. Indeed the application of the concept 
of civilisation enjoyed by this stage was quite distinct in 
Britain and Germany. See also G.N. Curzon’s justification 
for British rule in India in Gilmour 1994: 166.
15 See al-Afghani’s “Answer of Jamal al-Din to Renan” in 
Journal des Débats, 18 May 1883 (transl. by N. Keddie) in 
Keddie 1983: 183.
tated by the rule of law, which guaranteed certain free-
doms, such that Fath ʿAli Shah conceded in discussion 
with Sir John Malcolm that George III seemed to be 
little more than the first magistrate of the country and 
that, “Such a condition of power has permanence but it 
has no enjoyment: mine is enjoyment…but then it has 
no permanence.”16 Indeed, when three Qajar princes 
travelled to Britain in 1836 they were struck by the 
political realities they encountered and were reminded 
by their hosts that in times gone by, their own situation 
was much more chaotic but they had since adapted, 
learned, and applied both law and by extension order.17 
It was this stability that allowed for scientific advance 
and no effort was spared by the hosts in showing off 
both their political and scientific achievements. For 
British observers of Iran in this period, the problems 
of the country lay in its political structures (specifical-
ly the absence of institutions) not in the people them-
selves, more so because the Persians for all their flaws 
were an inherently “civilised” people who in Gibbon’s 
memorable phrase had been “long since civilised and 
corrupted”.18 In other words the Iranians had become 
decadent. Gibbon’s monumental Decline and Fall 
was of course a masterful study of the rise and fall 
of civilisations and not least of the impact of religion. 
It both symbolised and extended a particular—Whig-
gish—Enlightenment narrative about the possibilities 
of change that was naturally to prove attractive to 
reformers elsewhere.19
One of the ways in which these ideas were impart-
ed was through the membership of Masonic lodges, 
which the Iranian political and intellectual elite, small 
as it may have been at this time, appeared to have em-
braced with enthusiasm. The three princes certainly 
did not disguise their pleasure at having been asked to 
join “this most noble society”.20 There were obvious 
attractions of belonging to an intellectual fraternity 
in which they might be received as equals, but it is 
also worth remembering that the Masons retained a 
reputation for iconoclasm and anti-establishment-ism, 
especially on the continent. There was after all a rea-
16 Malcolm 1827: 215.
17 Mirza 1835: 28–29.
18 Pocock 2005: 24. As Pocock notes (2005: n. 19), it was thus 
possible to be—in the language of the time—“barbarian 
and civilized at the same time”.
19 For a discussion of Gibbon’s ideas see Furet 1976: 209–16; 
see also Trevor-Roper 2010: 129–43.
20 Mirza 1835: 123. They translate Freemason literally as 
azad-banna. 
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son they had chosen to remain secret societies, wary 
of the wrath of organised religion and latterly, the 
increasingly powerful reactionary state.21 Joining the 
Masons might facilitate access to ideas and networks 
but tradition dictated that it by no means implied sub-
servience to the state, even the British state. Adher-
ence to a political philosophy did not entail loyalty to 
a particular policy. It was thus entirely possible to find 
the political philosophy behind the contemporary Brit-
ish state—constitutionalism, rule of law, the Whiggish 
conception of progress—attractive, while remaining 
critical of policies. Indeed the British were good at 
it—and appeared to encourage it—themselves.22 
Even those who were ostensibly part of the ma-
chinery of government found themselves unable to 
reconcile their ideals with the practicalities of politics, 
as the diplomat Edward Eastwick found in a discus-
sion with an Iranian prince charged with protecting 
Khorasan:
“England professes herself to be an ally of Persia, and 
yet she pertinaciously opposes measures which are 
absolutely requisite to secure the Persian frontier. 
England assumes to be the determined enemy of 
the slave trade, and has gone to enormous expense 
to liberate the African races, to whom she is in no 
way bound save by the tie of common humanity. It 
is surely, then, inexplicable that England should have 
never lifted a finger to save or rescue the hundreds of 
thousands of Persians who are carried off into slavery 
by the Turkmans. So far from that, England shackles 
and impedes every effort that the Persian government 
makes for the protection of its own subjects, and, by 
expelling Persia from Herat, and even discouraging a 
friendly alliance between the two countries, renders 
the tranquillity of Khurasan impossible”. “I must con-
fess”, added Eastwick, “I thought there was a great 
deal of truth in the remarks of the prince…”23
A similar if somewhat more angry denunciation was 
expressed by Jamal al Din al-Afghani in the aftermath 
of the Tobacco Boycott, in an article which appeared 
in the Contemporary Review of London in 1892. The 
piece, entitled “The Reign of Terror in Persia”, was 
prefaced by a sympathetic introduction, which pre-
21 On the importance of Freemasonry to the radical enlight-
enment and its association with Whiggism, see Jacob 2006 
[1981]: esp. 80–111; see also Bayat 2010: 174.
22 On this see Bonakdarian 1993: 10, n. 13.
23 Eastwick 1864: 253–54.
sented Afghani to the readership as an “eminent Ori-
ental statesman…a man of cosmopolitan sympathies 
and encyclopaedic learning.” Afghani had reportedly 
already delivered a lecture on the subject (in French) 
and the print version left no doubt as to Afghani’s con-
tempt for the rule of Naser al-Din Shah, whose recent 
visit to Britain had apparently elicited praise where, 
Afghani felt, clearly none was warranted. “Let it be 
known”, thundered Afghani, “that under the present 
Shah we have no law and of late, I may add, no gov-
ernment.” He continued, “A patriarchal government 
without a written code is tolerable; but neither law nor 
government, only cruel, rapacious, unscrupulous and 
sleepless tyranny, that is not tolerable; yet that is our 
lot.”24 The people of Iran, argued Afghani, demanded 
a code of law and expected Britain to help them get 
one but instead its press and politicians were content 
to sanitise a tyrant who used every visit to extend his 
despotism. What is perhaps most striking about this 
extended protest is not the hypocrisy of British policy, 
but the sheer frustration that the British would not do 
more to help.
“What made the Persian believe that England meant 
to help them? I pray you, did not your Ministers a 
year or two ago urge upon the Shah a firman granting 
security of life and property to his subjects. Did not 
the Shah issue such a firman, and, after considerable 
pressure and long debate and hesitation, frankly com-
municate to the Powers? Did not her Majesty [Queen 
Victoria] upon hearing this express to Malcom Khan 
her profound satisfaction, and was not your Minister 
at Teheran regarded as a party to the transaction? All 
Persians believed that a firman thus issued and com-
municated to the European Powers gave the Powers, 
England first and foremost, the diplomatic right to 
insist upon its due observance, or at least to demand 
the explanation for any gross violation of it. Well, 
what followed? I, Sheikh Djemal ed Din, soon after 
became the natural and respectful mouthpiece of the 
people’s joyful aspirations. I am received with favour 
by His Majesty, my words are approved, the regen-
eration of Persia is at hand; law is to be given, life 
and property are to be safe, our wives and daughters 
protected from outrage, our bread winners from cruel 
and ruinous exactions—all is going well. Suddenly 
I am seized, banished, imprisoned: my friends were 
imprisoned and tortured, without explanation, with-
out trial…the peoples eyes were opened; they felt 
24 Al-Afghani 1892: 238–48 (reprinted in Ridgeon 2005: 5).
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they could place no reliance on the Shah…But their 
eyes were then to the Powers, to England first and 
foremost. Now would the British minister, at least, 
certainly speak one little word at Teheran, if only to 
ask for some explanation of so gross a violation of the 
blessed firman. But no not a word!”25
In other words the criticism was more nuanced than 
one would at first suspect and reflected the conflict 
between ideals and reality—in this case economic 
interest—that would continue to pit the application 
of British policy against the ideals and underlying 
political philosophy, which many Iranian intellectuals, 
including Afghani, continued to find attractive. His 
criticism of the shortcomings of British imperialism 
would have fell on receptive ears among the many 
Britons who likewise shared his reservations about the 
contradictions of policy and ideals, not least Edward 
Granville Browne, and in this sense just as later the 
critique of Orientalism would emanate from the heart 
of the West, so too the critique of imperialism came 
from within the heart of empire. 
Just how far this intimacy extended was reflected in 
the fact that Afghani, like many of his contemporaries, 
was an active Freemason, even going so far as to es-
tablish his own lodge in Cairo after he found the lodge 
he belonged to wanting in political activism. Indeed, 
Afghani was to prove an extremely active Mason, 
initially belonging to several lodges, and according to 
some accounts he was encouraged in this interest by the 
British Vice-Consul in Cairo to affiliate one particular-
ly important lodge with the United Grand Lodge of 
England.26 These ideological sympathies and Masonic 
associations have subsequently been disguised under 
a shroud of pan-Islamism for which Afghani was later 
to become famous, a label that was encouraged by 
Edward Browne;27 and it has often been difficult to 
chart a direct intellectual inheritance beyond general 
inspiration between successive generations of think-
ers, although there is evidence that Taqizadeh was well 
aware of Afghani’s striking response to Renan which, 
he notes in a later biographical note, had earned Re-
nan’s praise and added to Afghani’s reputation.28
A much clearer link is provided in the person of 
Malkom Khan, whom Afghani drew attention to in his 
25 Al-Afghani 1892: 12.
26 Kudsi-Zadeh 1972: 27–28.
27 Browne 1910: 1–30. The meaning of “pan-Islamism” has 
arguably shifted since Browne’s articulation.
28 Taqizadeh 1350/1972: 80.
aforementioned article as the progenitor of the idea of 
reform around a code of laws,29 and who, Taqizadeh 
noted in his autobiography, had the most profound in-
fluence on his own ideas.30 Malkom Khan also, unsur-
prisingly, features heavily in Browne’s own account of 
the Constitutional Revolution, where he has Wilfred 
Blunt31 describe him as, “the most remarkable man I 
had ever met, and [I am] more convinced than ever 
of the superior intelligence of the Eastern mind.”32 In 
Malkom Khan, the two strands of ideas and application 
become more apparent, with his promotion of reform 
and his establishment of a faramushkhaneh (lit. house 
of forgetfulness) modelled on the Masons, in which 
like-minded individuals “could meet to discuss reform 
ideas with great frankness behind closed doors.”33 
Whether this establishment can be considered the first 
lodge in Iran or not (it had no formal affiliation with 
any European lodge),34 the members were reportedly 
taught “that social order is founded on ten principles, 
which were: liberty, security of person, security of 
property, equality of rights, freedom of the pen, free-
dom of assembly and the merit system.”35
Moreover Malkom Khan’s philosophy may be 
gleaned from the revelation he made to Blunt, to have 
sought to establish a “religion of humanity” in Iran.36 
29 al-Afghani 1892: 6.
30 Taqizadeh 1990: 26. The other individual noted was Abdol 
Rahim Talebof, whose Ketab-e Ahmad, a fictional account 
of the education of Ahmad that was modelled on Rousseau’s 
Emile, sought to popularise many of the ideas articulated 
by Malkom Khan. By outlining the syllabus, Talebof intro-
duced the reader “to the material achievements and other 
manifestations of European civilisation…” (Bakhash 1978: 
347).
31 Wilfred Scawen Blunt was active in the cause of Arab and 
Ottoman sovereignty and the end of the British occupation 
of Egypt; see Bonakdarian 1995: 183. 
32 Browne 1910: 38.
33 Bakhash 1978: 7. On the etymology of this peculiar appel-
lation, which Algar has translated somewhat more sinisterly 
as “house of oblivion”, see Algar 1970: 279. As noted here, 
the term was probably coined in part to reflect the secrecy 
and “forgetfulness” of the participants. 
34 Bakhash 1978: 17.
35 Bakhash 1978: 19.
36 Browne 1910: 38. Malkom Khan claimed 30,000 adherents, 
a probable exaggeration to which Malkom Khan appears to 
have been prone, although for our purposes the aspiration 
is more telling than the numbers. One can speculate from 
comments like these and their reception, how and why the 
Bábi movement was so sympathetically received among 
European intellectuals, not least Browne (1910: 424–29). 
Azali Bábi influences on the Constitutional Movement 
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By all accounts Malkom Khan enjoyed a colourful 
political career and was given to embellishing some of 
his exploits, but his writings on the subject of reform 
most obviously in the “newspaper” he founded when 
exiled in London was to have a profound influence 
on a generation of political reformers not least, as we 
have seen, Taqizadeh. Qanun, or “Law”, may best be 
described as a political pamphlet rather than a news-
paper as we might understand it, but we can see it as 
the forerunner to Kaveh. In its polemics in support of 
legal reform, were the necessity for the rule of law and 
the need for individuals to improve themselves—to 
engage in a revolution of the mind. The mast of the 
newspaper was subtitled “harmony” (ettefaq), justice 
(ʿedalat), progress (taraqi), and the price of the first 
19 issues was listed as “sufficient comprehension” 
(fahm-e kafi). This was changed in later issues to the 
“condition of humanity” (shart-e adamiyyat), before 
finally an actual price (1 tuman) was affixed for each 
issue. The emphasis is laid on becoming virtuous men, 
in essence “gentlemen”37 (in the Whig conception 
of that term), in the service of humanity.38 It was the 
function of religion to provide the ethical basis for 
this development, and while Malkom Khan, who was 
Armenian and Christian by birth, did not dwell on the 
role of the ulema, he suggested that they could be a 
force for reform.39 
Malkom Khan had no doubt that the tyranny that 
befell Iran was due to an absence of laws: “A State 
without law means the destruction of the world. A 
state without law means the enemy of the rights of the 
people. Curses upon a state without law. Shame on 
those ignorant and dishonourable (bi-ghayrat) people 
who pay taxes to a state without law.”40 Although he 
argued for the establishment of an extended council 
(described by Browne as a parliament), Malkom 
Khan’s constitutionalism did not extend as far as to 
argue that a constitutional monarchy would be bene-
ficial to contemporary Iran. This was to be reformed 
from above, constructed by an elite and enforced by an 
autocrat. Indeed, what Iran needed was above all order 
and sound administration, and he exhorted the Shah 
to be the “Peter the Great” of Iran.41 It was sound and 
have been addressed in Amanat 2009: 23–54.
37 Adamiyyat might also be more literally translated as “men 
of honour”.
38 Browne 1910: 39.
39 Bakhash 1978:15–16.
40 Qanun, no. 15 (n.d.), p. 1. (translation my own).
41 Bakhash 1978: 10.
coherent administration that had made Europe great, 
and this was what Iran had to adopt, without excep-
tion. One could not pick and choose what one wanted, 
nor could one wait until these secrets of administration 
were learned, they had to be applied forthwith. There 
was, in sum, no point in relearning what the Europeans 
had learnt over the course of 3000 years. “In matters of 
government we cannot and must not invent anything 
ourselves. Either we must take the knowledge and ex-
perience of Europe as our model, or we cannot take a 
single step to rise out of our barbaric state.”42 
Such then was the febrile context of Hasan Taqiza-
deh’s political education, and his earlier pronunciations 
in the heat of revolution echoed the commentaries of 
his intellectual heroes. A product of the seminary, Ta-
qizadeh had proved a voracious reader and autodidact, 
learning both French and English in order to devour 
as many political and philosophical treatises as he 
could lay his hands on. In his youth he travelled to 
Baku, Beirut, and Egypt via Istanbul absorbing both 
published and illicit texts including those of the Young 
Turks.43 His declarations showed a clear debt to those 
who preceded him, as well as a greater depth of under-
standing of the European intellectual tradition he was 
absorbing. In many ways this reflected the reality of a 
century of gradual engagement with the ideas that had 
shaped a European civilisation that by his day truly 
dwarfed the Orient with its political, economic, and 
intellectual might. Like his predecessors and along 
with many of his intellectual contemporaries, Taqiza-
deh had become a Freemason and member of the Iran 
Awakening Lodge (bidari-ye Iran)44 in Tehran, play-
ing a leading role in the triumph of the Constitutional 
Revolution in 1906, although in the tempestuous 
developments that followed Mohammad ʿAli Shah’s 
coup, he found himself exiled in 1908. He promptly 
went to London and divested himself of his turban 
and gown, acquiring a suit and tie much to the disap-
pointment of his close associate Edward Browne, who 
had felt that Taqizadeh’s appeal for help would have 
been more effective had he retained a more authentic 
sartorial style.45 
Taqizadeh, like his intellectual forebears, had been 
deeply frustrated at the change in British policy that 
had effectively given Russia a free hand in dealing 
42 Bakhash 1978: 12–13.
43 Taqizadeh 1990: 26–45.
44 Bayat 2010: 179.
45 Bonakdarian 1993: 20.
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with the constitutional movement. His frustration 
was all the more intense because Britain had been 
instrumental in the initial success of the Revolution, 
offering sanctuary to the revolutionaries and despite 
some early misgivings, accepting a request from the 
revolutionaries to act as their formal intermediary with 
the government.46 Even when European priorities had 
dictated a détente with Russia and a more reserved 
approach to the Constitutionalists, Grey was advising 
his staff that, “There was no question of taking any 
joint action against [the] spread of liberal principles in 
Asia.”47 Even the architect of Britain’s rapprochement 
with Tsarist Russia found the consequences for British 
ideals somewhat galling. Nonetheless the signing of 
the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 and the secret 
clauses not to interfere in respective “spheres of in-
fluence”, effectively gave Russia a free hand to crush 
the revolutionary movement in those areas allocated 
to her—largely the populated and politically active 
north (Britain’s share of this remarkable agreement, 
which seems to have been dictated by the priorities of 
British India rather than British imperial concerns in 
toto, was Iranian Baluchestan). Such was the faith of 
Iranian constitutional leaders in the support of Britain 
to counteract the Russians that even one of the leading 
mojtahids, Sayyed ʿAbdullah Behbahani, had written 
repeatedly to the British chargé d’affaires in Tehran 
for financial and political assistance.48
This was the context of Taqizadeh’s “Appeal to Eng-
land” issued in 1908,49 which had echoes of Afghani 
and sought with perhaps less anger and more emotion, 
to embarrass British officials into action. The Appeal, 
which was privately printed by Cambridge University 
Press in October 1908, has all the hallmarks of having 
been the result of a close collaboration with Edward 
Browne, including an appeal to British interest (com-
merce) and fear of Russia, which had grown dominant 
as a consequence of British neglect (a theme that lay 
at the heart of Lord Curzon’s Persia and the Persian 
46 “General Report on Persian for the year 1906: Sir Cecil 
Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey”, dated 29 January 1907, 
p. 6, reprinted in Burrell, Vol. III 1997: 78.
47 Bonakdarian 2006: 52. The complex British relationship 
with Iran in the crucial period is excellently laid out in 
Bonakdarian’s book; see also the comments of Hardinge to 
Grey dated 3 January 1906, p. 10, reprinted in Burrell, Vol. 
II, 1997, 494.
48 Bonakdarian 200653. 
49 Taqizadeh 1977: 451–62. The Appeal is signed by both 
Taqizadeh and Motazed ed Saltana.
Question, and would have been immediately familiar 
to any British statesman). Although Russian influence 
reigned supreme at the Persian court, Taqizadeh as-
sured his readers that, “England has the sympathy and 
admiration of the Persian people, who had an ancient 
and almost hereditary belief in the civilization of the 
French and English, while they regarded the Russians 
as semi-civilized barbarians.” Taqizadeh detailed the 
means and ways in which the Russians were interfer-
ing with the progress of the constitution and argued 
that at the centre of autocracy, was the “ancient foe of 
all liberal ideas”. Not only did the Iranian parliament 
“in some measure” owe its existence to England, “The 
Persian Constitution…was in an especial sense the 
spiritual child of Great Britain”. It was because of this 
that British inaction seemed inexplicable to Taqizadeh 
and his fellow revolutionaries, not that they stressed 
they wanted British help for the sake of it, or to draw 
Britain into a wider domestic struggle, but because 
Britain had left the field open to the Russians to in-
tervene. This “betrayal” was haemorrhaging British 
influence in Iran as Iranians lost their faith in Britain. 
He ended on a thunderous note:
“For, we repeat once more, with confidence and cer-
tainty, the interests of the Persian people and of En-
gland are identical, and if the reactionaries triumph, 
all England’s influence in Persia, both political and 
commercial, is at an end, and the Russian spirit in 
a Persian body will be the autocrat of Persia…The 
Persian Constitution came into being under the aus-
pices of England, and is England’s spiritual child. For 
a century the Persians have regarded England as their 
friend, and today their hopes are fixed on her alone. 
And so we, a little while ago like yourselves Mem-
bers of a National Assembly (now alas! destroyed by 
violence), but now exiles who can only hope to help 
our country by arousing your sympathy, to seek which 
we have come so long a journey, make our appeal 
to you on behalf of our beloved land, and on behalf 
of the liberties and laws whereby alone her welfare 
and even her independent existence can be secured, 
in this place, whither for so long the oppressed have 
turned for help, and which is the fulcrum of all free 
institutions and the ancient home of Liberty.”
Taqizadeh was of course eventually to be disappoint-
ed, and in his frustration with the British and during 
the Great War he, along with a number of colleagues, 
relocated to Berlin where they launched the influential 
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nationalist newspaper Kaveh. The newspaper was run 
in two separate series, the first of which—published 
during the war—tended to pay all due reverence to 
their German hosts. But it was the second series start-
ed after the war that was to prove more influential in 
terms of prescriptions and advice for the reconstruc-
tion and resurrection of Iran. It has been conjectured 
that this sojourn in Berlin transformed Taqizadeh and 
his colleagues from Enlightened liberals (Whigs) into 
nationalists in the continental mould, but this is not 
reflected in Taqizadeh’s subsequent associations and 
affiliations, which remained resolutely British, nor 
does it reflect the reality that Berlin remained then 
and for many years afterwards, among the most liberal 
parts of the German Reich. The important point to note 
is that Taqizadeh remained very much part of a tradi-
tion of Whig activism which drew its inspiration from 
a singularly British Enlightenment along with a legacy 
of activism that could be traced back to Afghani and 
Malkom Khan. If the Persian Constitution was the 
spiritual child of Britain, then Kaveh was the spiritual 
child of Qanun, and contrary to his subsequent reputa-
tion, Taqizadeh’s language was to be more temperate 
and refined than that of his predecessors, especially 
when one considers the context of his rage.
Despite pronouncing itself neutral during the 
Great War, Iran found itself a battlefield for others 
as Russian, Ottoman, and British troops heedlessly 
marched their troops across Iranian sovereign territory 
in search of advantage and in the protection of par-
ticular interests. Were that not bad enough, German 
agents conspired to manipulate a political process 
that seemed only too receptive to political overtures 
(often breaking their own avowed neutrality in the 
process), while Wilhelm Wassmuss—the German T.E. 
Lawrence—successfully incited the tribes of southern 
Iran to mobilise against British occupying forces. For 
Iranian constitutionalists who had laid so much store 
on the success of the Constitutional Revolution to es-
tablish a stable, legal government for the welfare of an 
Iranian commonwealth, the situation they faced was 
nothing short of catastrophic. Not only was any form 
of government seemingly absent—with devastating 
consequences for the social and economic fabric of the 
country—but the “virtue” that was meant to charac-
terise this new “republic of laws” was clearly in short 
supply. Although it would be natural for successor 
governments, in their efforts to establish order and 
justify the measures taken to achieve it, to exaggerate 
the state of “chaos” that afflicted Iran, it would also be 
fair to say that the situation as regards the Iranian state 
had rarely (and certainly not in recent memory) been 
so poor.50 In this context, Taqizadeh’s sense of urgency 
was understandable. 
It was in this context also that Taqizadeh first 
drew the attention of his readers to the necessity for 
Iranians to adopt the ways of the Europeans without 
reservation, a call to arms that would come to haunt 
him and which he admitted on reflection some years 
later, had erred on the side of recklessness, even if his 
intention had been, in his own words, to throw a “gre-
nade” into the hitherto stultifying political discourse 
of the day.51 It says much of the sense of desperation 
shared by many intellectuals at the time that in stark 
contrast to the opprobrium that was to be heaped upon 
him by subsequent critics, his contemporaries largely 
applauded him, even if some felt that the manner in 
which he had expressed himself was less than subtle.52 
Interestingly, most appear to have focused on the 
single slogan highlighted in bold in 1920, uncompro-
misingly calling for Iran to become outwardly and 
inwardly, materially and spiritually, European (Iran 
bayad zaheran va batenan, jesman va rohan farangi 
maab shavad o bas).53 Taqizadeh later noted that this 
phrase was in fact not his but that of an Ottoman Kurd-
ish thinker, Dr ʿAbdullah Jodat (who he remarked had 
perhaps become too Francophone for his own good),54 
and noted that the word farang itself was both a little 
too archaic and broad for his more specific purposes. 
Indeed in the pages of Kaveh itself, once on the very 
same page (if on a different column) as the notorious 
call to arms, and again a year later, Taqizadeh quite spe-
cifically articulated the same argument with reference 
to “European civilisation”. The phrase has therefore 
been articulated at least three separate times, with the 
most quoted version most likely a paraphrasing from 
another thinker altogether, while the version outlined 
in 1921 is the most temperate and refined of all three. 
In its longer articulation in the 1920 edition, Ta-
qizadeh takes care to underline his demand which is 
50 See in this regard, Bast 2009: 55–68.
51 Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 28.
52 Behnam 2003: 81–82.
53 Kaveh 22 January 1920: 2, col. 2. Atabaki argues persua-
sively that the word ruhan in this context would be better 
translated as “mentally”. It would certainly conform better 
to Taqizadeh’s preoccupation with education; see Atabaki 
2008: 48.
54 Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 30.
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the acceptance and promotion of the civilisation of Eu-
rope without reservation, and adds for good measure 
that the surrender to Europe must be absolute as well 
as the acquisition of the manners, culture, and science 
of farangistan without qualification, except that it was 
noted in parentheses, almost as if he had realised a 
little too late that his call erred on the extreme side, 
with regard to language.55 This caveat was of course 
significant, given the importance of language to the 
conception of Iranian identity and culture and in this 
respect, even in this early robust outing, the call to 
arms had already been qualified and restricted in im-
portant ways. By January 1921, the message remained 
but tempers had calmed considerably and for the first 
time Taqizadeh fully contextualised his demand.56 It 
is in this issue of Kaveh that the 23 prescriptions (17 
essential and a further six desirable) for the revival 
of Iran are laid out in full and the first demand is 
for universal public education and self-awareness, 
followed by a demand for the publication of useful 
books and the translation and publication of Western 
books. Few statements articulate the driving ideology 
of the Enlightenment than these demands for mass 
education and self-awareness. It is only by point 3 that 
we come to the appeal for the adoption of European 
civilisation and here the statement is stripped of the 
more excessive rhetoric of the previous year’s edi-
tion. Here Taqizadeh simply states, “The acquisition 
of the principles, culture and traditions of European 
civilisation [this last phrase is underlined for effect] 
and its acceptance without reservation (aghaz-e osul 
va adab va rosum-e tammadon-e europai va ghabul an 
belashart)”. The remaining prescriptions are an ad hoc 
mixture of the abstract and the practical with calls for 
the preservation of the unity of the nation and protec-
tion of the language from “corruption”, the promotion 
of physical exercise, a war against disease, freedom 
for women, and a war against lying and ambiguity. 
Critics of Taqizadeh have been less exercised—if in-
deed they have noticed at all—by his 15th prescription 
to “rid ourselves of the shameful practice of unnatural 
love”, which he considered “was a major obstacle to 
civilization”. The call to emulate Europe is shorn of its 
appeals to the spiritual and the material, or indeed to 
any call for “absolute surrender”, suggesting that Ta-
qizadeh (perhaps on receiving feedback) decided that 
the sentiment would be more effective if the expres-
55 Kaveh 22 January 1920: 2, col. 1.
56 Kaveh 11 January 1921: 2.
sion was toned down. That he underlined the phrase 
“European civilisation” in the third and final rendition 
of the statement suggests also that he sought to draw 
specific attention to the particularity of his call, and 
we know that on later reflection he felt the original 
term, farang, to be too broad for his purposes.
Taqizadeh’s own education, his intellectual inher-
itance and sympathies, as well as his membership of 
the Freemasons, all suggest that he had a very good 
idea of what he understood by the term when he used 
it, and that its use was deliberate and defined. He must 
have been aware, for example, given his six years in 
Germany at the height of the Great War, that the term 
“civilisation” had developed a distinct and separate 
meaning in the Germanic world (and further east), 
where the term “culture” had come to occupy the place 
of civilisation in the Franco-British intellectual estab-
lishment.57 While British usage had also developed 
two distinct if inter-related meanings by the nineteenth 
century, it still held, in the mind of many intellectuals a 
powerful association with progress and the cultivation 
of civility, which could be achieved through dedicat-
ed education. As a process of mental and “spiritual” 
improvement, it of course lent itself to a stage theory 
of history, one that was perhaps best expressed by 
Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of the consciousness 
of freedom and the “cunning of reason”. Hegel’s con-
fidence in the progress of “history” from—it should 
not be forgotten—the Persians (“in Persia first arises 
that light which shines itself, and illuminates what is 
around; for Zoroaster’s ‘Light’ belongs to the World 
of Consciousness”58) to the Greeks and Romans, to 
be triumphantly inherited by the Germanic people, 
was provided with a useful qualification by Gibbon’s 
Decline and Fall which pointedly reminded its readers 
that the direction of travel could always be reversed. 
It was the recognition of this important fact that made 
the Enlightenment narrative of education so powerful 
and redemptive. If progress could be lost, it could 
also be rediscovered and regained. After all European 
civilisation was proof of this, as it had moved from 
the Dark Ages to rebirth and enlightenment. There was 
nothing, in its inception at least, that was peculiarly 
European about this process. This was a powerful 
narrative of redemption and emancipation that was to 
prove immensely attractive to those less fortunate.
It was perhaps less in his appreciation of the re-
57 On this distinction see Braudel 1993: 4–6.
58 Hegel 1956: 173.
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generative qualities of “civilisation” that happened 
to be currently enjoying a resurgence in Europe, that 
Taqizadeh could be open to criticism than in his almost 
unquestioning acceptance of the grand narrative of that 
European ascent. This was, in fairness to Taqizadeh, 
neither unusual nor unexpected given the emphatic 
dominance of European civilisation and science by the 
turn of the twentieth century, and indeed both Afghani 
and Malkom Khan had accepted that Europe had in-
herited the mantle of civilisation that in previous ages 
may have lain elsewhere. It is also true that Taqizadeh 
would not have been aware of the revolution on his-
toriography that has since occurred, and to which his 
own considerable research undoubtedly contributed. 
Nevertheless, by the turn of the twentieth century a 
narrative of ascent, both general and particular, had 
been well established and Taqizadeh was to adopt both. 
Indeed, drawing on a particularly Whiggish in-
terpretation of history, the introduction to his party’s 
constitution, drawn up in 1909, stated categorically 
that the twentieth century was the equivalent of the 
seventeenth century in the West; a period of renewal 
when feudalism and absolutism would be swept away 
by capitalism.59 Later, in the aftermath of the Great 
War and faced with the stark reality that there was no 
coherent central government whatsoever, Taqizadeh 
returned to the European narrative to see what lessons 
might be found there for Iran. The key, echoing his 
intellectual mentor Malkom Khan, was to ensure first 
and foremost the establishment of order and good 
administration, enablers that could then allow the ben-
efits of the Enlightenment to spread to wider society. 
What Iran needed, Taqizadeh concluded in a commen-
tary written some months after the coup of 1921 (led 
in part by Reza Khan), was “Enlightened despotism 
(estebdad monavar)”, of the type that transformed Eu-
ropean governments in the eighteenth century. Despite 
the widespread admiration for the French Revolution 
and Napoleon, a “Napoleon” was neither sufficient 
nor viable in a country as reactionary as Iran. What 
was needed, in further echoes of Malkom Khan, was 
an Iranian “Peter the Great”.60 What was demanded 
was a revolution from above led by an enlightened 
ruler who could transform society (Peter the Great, it 
was helpfully pointed out, had forbidden the wearing 
of beards) as well as the political fortunes of the coun-
try. It was not, as Taqizadeh was careful to point out, a 
59 Behnam 2003: 79.
60 Kaveh 4 September 1921: 3. 
matter of desirability—constitutionalism remained the 
best form of government—but of necessity.61
On the larger question of the “Grand Narrative” 
as outlined above, Taqizadeh also found himself in 
broad agreement with the narrative of civilisation 
developed by European (Enlightenment) thinkers, and 
indeed as his activism gave way to scholarship, it was 
on these longer narratives that his attention became 
fixed. For Taqizadeh, civilisation, essentially an ur-
ban phenomenon which emerged in the Greek world, 
was protected and nurtured by Islam, while Europe 
languished in its “Dark Ages”, before returning to 
the “Renaissance” West from whence it proceeded to 
flower and progress.62 Indeed for Taqizadeh, although 
classical Islamic civilisation harnessed the ideas of the 
Greeks it never surpassed their achievements, which to 
his mind remained an extraordinary period in human 
civilisation. There were nonetheless, in Taqizadeh’s 
view, four distinct ages in human civilisation: the 
emergence of writing from 4000 to about 700 BC; the 
era of Greek civilisation from the sixth century BC to 
around the third century AD; the era of classical Islam-
ic civilisation from c. the ninth century AD to c. the 
thirteenth century AD; and finally the era of Western 
civilisation from 1453. These were, as noted above, 
fundamentally intellectual (ʿelmi) ages—the ages 
were not necessarily contiguous—which provided the 
environment from which other achievements of civili-
sation could emerge. Yet none of the other things could 
be achieved without the philosophical and scientific 
foundations upon which they might be built. It is also 
worth remembering here that the concept of a distinct 
“Islamic” civilisation where these “humanistic” ideas 
were nurtured and developed, was very much a product 
of this Enlightenment narrative, having its basis in the 
cosmopolitan outlook of early Enlightenment thinkers 
before being further articulated and clarified in the 
nineteenth century.63 
What was perhaps striking in Taqizadeh’s adoption 
of this intellectual stage theory of history was the 
absence of any key role for a distinctly Iranian civili-
sation, and this seems to have irritated a number of his 
more youthful critics who protested at his championing 
of Greek thought over that of the Persians. Indeed in 
his later historical writings, Taqizadeh laid far more 
emphasis on the importance of Islam than his earlier 
61 See Vatandoust 1977: 205.
62 Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 31–37.
63 See, for example, Israel 2006: 615–40.
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activism might have suggested, and there was little ob-
vious Persian chauvinism in his historical assessments, 
to the point that one could speculate that he may have 
been compensating for an earlier radicalism that he 
felt may have been, in part, responsible for the sort of 
chauvinism he now witnessed among the faux Iranian 
nationalists he so detested and had bitterly warned 
about.64 In one exchange, for example, Taqizadeh found 
himself challenged by a youthful critic who sought to 
argue that the idea of “justice” was clearly so prevalent 
in Iranian history that it must have predated anything 
the Europeans (or indeed the Greeks) could have con-
ceived. Taqizadeh gently responded that words and 
meaning were quite different and it was erroneous to 
suggest that the meaning of justice in the ancient world 
was the same as it is today.65 At the same time, it is 
important to bear in mind that the concept of Islamic 
civilisation clearly did not preclude the important con-
tributions of the Iranians, who in a narrative tradition 
that would even be endorsed by the clergy, were re-
garded as central to the triumph of that civilisation.66 
Be that as it may, Taqizadeh was emphatic on the 
importance of Greek civilisation and the ideas they had 
generated and passed on, ultimately to the Europeans. 
Greek civilisation, Taqizadeh argued, was a powerful 
light that, like the rising sun, had subsumed all other 
stars.67 It was a civilisation of science and ideas, not 
simple material achievements, and when he had talked 
of adopting the civilisation of Europe, he did not mean 
its superficial (material) achievements, but the core 
ideas that had shaped and liberated it. This could only 
be achieved through mass education. Fundamentally, 
Taqizadeh argued, it was about the absorption of the 
idea of freedom.68 A self-confident free people had 
nothing to fear for their identity from an engagement 
with the ideas of others, as witnessed by the Japanese. 
Nor did this engagement with progress preclude a 
fierce adherence and conservatism to one’s own val-
ues and culture, as shown by the British.69
64 Taqizadeh warned about the emergence as he saw it of the 
professional patriot—the vatan-chi—in Kaveh, 17 July 
1920: 3. See also his response to a question in Taqizadeh 
1379/2001: 100–1. Among his more popular histories was 
Az Parviz ta Changiz (1382/2003: 235).
65 Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 101–3.
66 Most notably Ayatollah Motahhari. For an analysis of his 
views see Aghaie 2009: 245–53.
67 Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 35.
68 Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 53.
69 Taqizadeh 1379/2001: 57–58.
It is perhaps in his discussion of the idea of freedom 
that Taqizadeh’s philosophy—and debt to the Whig-
gish narratives of the Enlightenment—shines through. 
Taqizadeh acknowledges that this “celebrated word” 
has been much discussed, but of course the purpose 
and beneficiaries of political, civil, and spiritual free-
dom are the general populace, a reality that was first 
appreciated by the Athenians and then sporadically by 
the Romans. The Athenian inheritance, however, was 
only truly appropriated by the Europeans, and freedom 
as we understand the term today, first emerged in the 
constitutional limitations on power imposed in the 
thirteenth century in England (presumably the Magna 
Carta and its consequences), and then much later in 
France, during the Revolution of 1789.70 He added for 
good measure that freedom was the greatest blessing 
bestowed by God upon man, and without it, there 
could be no growth in thinking and wisdom.71 Free-
dom was the foundation on which true patriotism and 
the nation could be built. Love of country could not be 
imposed from above, only nurtured from below, and 
Europe proved that neither language nor race were the 
building blocks of a nation. Real—civic—national-
ism, could only be rooted in the fertile soil of freedom 
and justice.72 Few statements better encapsulate the 
Enlightenment project.
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